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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,
: NOT INCARCERATED
v.
MITCHELL WORWOOD,

Case No. 20060048-SC

DEFENDANT/PETITIONER.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
On Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

JURISDICTION
Petitioner, MITCHELL WORWOOD ("Worwood"), appeals from the Utah Court
of Appeal's decision affirming the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539 (Addendum C). This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §7 8-2-2(3 )(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: This Court granted certiorari as to the following issue:
Whether delay in the performance of a field sobriety test and transportation of a
suspect may be justified by the inability of an officer to immediately effectuate a
formal arrest or by the existence of more suitable circumstances for performing the
test at another location. See, Order.1

l

Worwood assumes that in granting certiorari on this narrow question, this Court is
aware from the Petition that there was no evidence that the delayed performance of a field

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "On certiorari, [this Court] review[s] the court of
appeals' decision for correctness, focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the
district court's decision under the appropriate standard of review. An appellate court
reviews a district court's decision concerning the constitutionality of a search and seizure
for correctness, applying no deference to the district court's legal conclusion." State v.
Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, ^9 (citations and quotations omitted). Search and seizure cases
present mixed questions of law and fact that are reviewed for correctness based on a
totality of the circumstances. Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ^|8, 122 P.3d 506.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In September 2003, Worwood was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol with two prior convictions, a third degree felony (Rl). A preliminary hearing was
conducted on December 12, 2003 (R91), and a hearing on Worwood's subsequent motion
to suppress evidence was conducted on February 6, 2004 (R92). The trial court denied
Worwood's Motion to Suppress Evidence (R24) in its Ruling dated April 13, 2004 (R60;
Addendum A). On June 2, 2004, Worwood entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to
State v. Sery, 788 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R75), and was sentenced on July 20, 2004

sobriety test was the result of either the officer's inability to effectuate a formal arrest or
because conditions at the stop were unsuitable. The officer in this case could have
effectuated the arrest, conditions were suitable, but performing a test would have
inconvenienced the officer. He testified that he did not perform the test because "I didn't
want to" and because he did not want to "mess up" his night (R92:10-14). However, the
question of whether a delay might be justified under the narrow circumstances outlined in
this Court's Order appears to be one of first impression in Utah.
2

(R77). Worwood timely filed his Notice of Appeal on August 13, 2004 (R81).
On appeal Worwood argued that the trial court's findings and conclusions that the
seizure of Worwood was only a level two encounter were incorrect based on the record
evidence set forth below, and that the officer's conduct constituted a de facto arrest
without probable cause and was thus in violation of both article I, section 14 of the Utah
constitution (Addendum B), and the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution
(Addendum B).
Noting Justice Thome's dissent, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected Worwood's
arguments and affirmed his conviction on December 15, 2005. State v. Worwood, 2005
UT App 539 (Addendum C). The court stated:
"We appreciate the concerns expressed by our colleague in his dissent and note
that Trooper Wright's mode of investigation would be permissible only in the
rarest of circumstances and that this case ultimately turns on the unique set of facts
it presents, albeit on a sparse record. . . . Trooper Wright testified that he was
returning from horseback riding in a pickup truck with an attached horse trailer,
had no means of communication, and was not equipped to make a formal arrest.2 . .
. Although Trooper Wright may have been able to perform a sufficient field
sobriety test on Worwood at the point of the initial encounter in Deep Canyon and
possibly to transport him to the Juab County Jail, it was not unreasonable for him
to drive Worwood to a nearby location in the town to permit an on-duty officer to
perform a field sobriety test and, if necessary, effect a formal arrest. . . . Finally,
there is no evidence that the change of location significantly extended the
encounter, and the record gives no indication that under these unique
circumstances Trooper Wright was motivated by any purpose other than quickly
and effectively resolving his suspicion that Worwood was intoxicated."3 Id. at ^J9.
2

Trooper Wright testified that he could have made an arrest. See, fn. 1, supra.

3

The record tells a different story. Citing the record in his dissent, Justice Thorne
noted, "[The officer].. .did not want to 'mess [] up [his] night' by incurring the
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 20, 2004, Utah Highway Patrol trooper, Cory Wright ("Wright" or
"Trooper Wright"), who was off duty (R92:4), and his friend, Skyler Fautin ("Fautin")
(R92:10), were driving an unmarked vehicle out of Deep Canyon in Juab County where
they had been riding horses (R92:5). Wright testified that he observed a white truck
parked on the road, a wet spot on the road, and a partially crushed beer can near the wet
spot (R92:5). Worwood, who had been standing near his truck, entered the truck and
moved it to the side of the road to allow Wright to pass (R92:5-6). Wright did not
observe any unusual driving pattern by Worwood (R92:6).
Wright testified that his law enforcement job "kicked in" (R92.7), so he stopped,
rolled down his passenger window, and without identifying himself as a police officer
although Worwood knew he was (R92:15), asked Worwood if he was okay (R92: 6-7).
Worwood responded "Yeah" and said that he had stopped to relieve himself (R92:7).
Wright testified, "The way [Worwood] was talking, he was talking slow, slurred. He had
bloodshot eyes that you could see and so I got out of my vehicle at that point once I talked
to him a little bit, I felt like, hey, maybe I'll - 1 need to get next to this guy. He appears to
be intoxicated, have alcohol in his - " (R92:7).
Wright did not smell the odor of alcohol at this time, the only indicia of drinking

responsibility for Worwood's potential arrest and its accompanying paperwork. Instead,
he wanted to hand off the situation to a fellow officer. State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App
539, fn. 4.
4

being bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, which Wright admitted could have been caused
by something other than intoxication (R92:13). However, Wright testified that based on
these two observations, he refused to allow Worwood to drive his vehicle and Worwood
was not free to leave (R92:15). Wright testified that he intended to take Worwood into
custody at this point based solely on his slurred speech and bloodshot eyes (R92-13-16)
Wright made Worwood exit his vehicle; he was "not going to let [Worwood] drive
until a Trooper looked at him" (R92:13). As Worwood complied, Wright did not smell
alcohol nor did he observe any staggering, body sway, or other indicia of intoxication
(R92:9-10). Wright could have performed field sobriety tests on Worwood at the stop but
refused to do so because "I didn't want to" (R92:10-11, 14). He testified, 'it would have
messed up my night" because it "would have been my arrest" (R92:10, 16). Therefore,
for this reason alone, Wright opted to seize Worwood and transport Worwood to Wright's
private residence (R92.TO, 14).
Wright seized Worwood's truck, took Worwood into custody and transported him
in Wright's truck to Wright's private residence, about a mile and a half away (R92:10).
Wright first detected the odor of alcohol after taking Worwood into custody and upon
getting into the truck with Worwood (R92: 9). Wright directed Fautin to follow in
Worwood's truck (R92.T0). Some unknown time later, Utah Highway Patrol trooper
Kevin Wright (Cory Wright's brother) responded to Trooper Wright's home, conducted
field sobriety tests and transported Worwood to the Juab County Jail (R91:17).

5

The foregoing record facts are not disputed. Although the trial court erroneously
suggested in its findings denying Worwood's motion to suppress evidence that Trooper
Wright may have detected the odor of alcohol prior to entering Wright's truck with him,
and further speculated that perhaps the canyon road was not a suitable place to conduct
field sobriety tests (R60; Addendum A), these assertions are contrary to the record set
forth in detail above, which record was not disputed below. Trooper Wright testified that
he was capable of conducting field sobriety tests at the time of the stop, but that he simply
did not want to (R92:10-14). He also testified that he did not detect the odor of alcohol
until after he entered his truck and after taking Worwood into custody (R92:9). As
Justice Thorne stated in his dissent, "The only competent evidence of the events
surrounding Worwood's encounter with Wright was Wright's testimony at the
suppression hearing." State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, ^[14 (J. Thorne, dissenting).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT "IT WAS NOT
UNREASONABLE" FOR THE OFFICER TO TRANSPORT WORWOOD
TO ANOTHER LOCATION FOR FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS, WHEN THE
OFFICER COULD HAVE PERFORMED THE TESTS AT THE
LOCATION OF THE STOP, IS INCORRECT.
A.

The officer's conduct was a de facto arrest and violated article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

Worwood argued below that the officer's conduct violated both the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See, BRIEF OF
APPELLANT ("Br. Appt.") at 5-10. This continues to be Worwood's position.
6

However, based upon guidance from this Court, article I, section 14 provides
greater uniformity of search and seizure law than does the Fourth Amendment, thereby
offering both greater privacy protections to Utah citizens and more practical guidance for
law enforcement in an area that is growing increasingly complex and inconsistent under
Fourth Amendment analysis. Accordingly, Worwood expressly requests this Court to
review the issue raised herein under article I, section 14.
Several years ago this Court noted, "choosing to give the Utah Constitution a
somewhat different construction [than the Fourth Amendment] may prove to be an
appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by the federal courts." State v. Larocco,
19A P.2d 460, 465 (1990) (citing numerous other state courts holding that their own
constitutions provided greater protection to their citizens than the Fourth Amendment
does) (quoting State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, n.8 (Utah 1988).4
More recently, this Court stated, "article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, Ifl 1 (further
quoting Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Larocco that "this Court should be both

4

See also, State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) (concurring opinion of
Stewart, Justice, and concurring and dissenting opinion of Durham, Justice, stating that
this Court "should not be bound to construe Utah Constitutional provisions in light of
federal law," and that a "contingent relationship between Utah's constitution and the
federal. . . [has not been] adopted by this [C]ourt" and "should never be").
7

the ultimate and final arbiter of the meaning of the provisions of the Utah Declaration of
Rights and the primary protector of individual liberties")- Id. at ^[13. In Brigham City,
this Court was particularly concerned that the result of a lack of analysis under article I,
section 14 might be "a de facto abdication of [this Court's] responsibility as guardians of
the individual liberty of our citizens". Id. at 1J14;5 State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, \\2
(Utah 2005) (noting that article I, section 14 provides greater protections to citizens than
the Fourth Amendment).
Applied to the facts in this case, as an initial matter this Court has formally taken
the position that "warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent
circumstances require action before a warrant can be obtained." Larocco at 470 (citation
omitted). Exigent circumstances may exist when there is a threat of physical harm or
destruction of evidence. See, Brigham City ^28-44. However, Worwood and his truck
were seized in this case not because of exigent circumstances, but because Trooper
Wright decided to pass Worwood off to another officer - because he was off-duty and did
not want to conduct field sobriety tests (R92:10-14). Hence, Worwood was seized on the
basis of "probable inconvenience."
Officer inconvenience, the only reason given in this case for seizing Worwood and
transporting him to another location, is not recognized as an exigent circumstance

5

See also, State v. Brake, 103 P.3d 699, 703 (Utah 2004), wherein this Court
addressed similar concerns.
8

justifying a warrantless seizure - under either federal or state law Thus, the warrantless
seizure of Worwood was a de facto arrest not supported b> probable cause and in
violation of both article I, section 14, and the Fourth Amendment6
However, in granting certiorari in this case, this Court ordered analysis of whether
an officer's inability to immediately effectuate a formal arrest, or more suitable conditions
at a different location, might justify a delay (i.e., transporting the defendant) in
conducting field sobriety tests.
Initially, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance where an officer would ha\e the
ability to transport an individual to another location if the officer truly was unable to
effectuate a formal arrest at the scene of the stop In Utah, "an arrest is an actual restraint
of the person arrested or submission to custody " Utah Code Ann §77-7-1
The evidence in this case is that Worwood submitted himself to custody, I e., was
arrested. A de facto arrest also occurs when the events are indistinguishable from an
arrest. See, Dunaway v New York, 442 U S 200, 212 (1979) (explaining that the taking

6

See e g, State v Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f36, 63 P 3d 650 ("A level three
encounter involves an arrest, which has been characterized as a highly intrusive or lengthy
detention that requires probable cause ") (quotations and citations omitted) State v
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (twan officer may seize a person
if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'") (citations omitted), Salt Lake City v
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, P10 (same); State v Chism, 2005 UT App 41, f 12 ("Officers must
diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, and it is unlawful to continue the detention after reasonable suspicion
is dispelled.") (citations and quotations omitted).
9

of a murder suspect to the police station for investigative purposes was not merely an
investigative detention, but was an arrest).
However, if an officer was faced with an uncooperative suspect who resisted
efforts to transport him to another location based solely on reasonable suspicion, the
suspect would either escape (if the officer truly was unable to effectuate an arrest) or ha\e
to be actually restrained in order to transport him safely. Moreover, he would be subject
to lawful arrest for resisting, thereby making the issue of delay moot in the case of a
resisting suspect. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) (holding that resisting
even an unlawful seizure is itself a crime under the applicable statute).
Thus, the only context in which the question of a delayed investigative detention
could apply is one involving a cooperative suspect. But under Utah law, a suspect is
arrested when he submits himself to custody; so an officer always has the means of
arresting a cooperative person. Utah Code Ann. §77-7-1. Therefore, there is no situation
where an officer, acting solely on the basis of reasonable suspicion, cannot effect an
arrest. If the suspect resists, the officer has probable cause and the issue is moot; if the
suspect submits himself to custody, the officer has the means to arrest. The fact that an
officer may lack means of communication or handcuffs should not diminish constitutional
protections, including requirements for establishing probable cause prior to arrest.
Further, the real problem with giving law enforcement a license to transport
individuals during a purported investigative detention to a "more suitable location," is the

10

slippery slope inherent in the definition of "more suitable." This case presents a good
example of how "more suitable" would be open to subjective interpretation and abuse.
Here, an off-duty officer "didn't want to" (R92:11) be bothered with conducting field
sobriety tests and the paperwork consequent to an arrest. Hence, "more suitable*' was
defined by officer whim and convenience.
As this case demonstrates and completely opposed to article I, section 14 as
defined by this Court, a license to transport suspects to a "more suitable" location would
expand the scope of an investigative detention, invite creative and subjective speculation
and interpretation of the term "more suitable," and thereby diminish the rights of citizens.
Thus, the practical result of the court of appeals' decision is that it directly
undermines the protections provided by article I, section 12. It diminishes citizens' rights
by allowing them to be taken into custody without a warrant or probable cause. The
decision thereby creates inconsistency rather than uniformity of the law, and obscures and
complicates the parameters of an investigative detention such that the line between an
investigative detention and an arrest is effectively eliminated.
Thus, under article I, section 14, Trooper Wright's unnecessary seizure of
Worwood exceeded the scope of an investigative detention. Trooper Wright did not want
to be bothered with the extra work that would have resulted if field sobriety tests had
shown impairment. As he testified, "it would have been my arrest" (R92:10, 16) so "T
didn't want to" (R92:l 1), because "it would have messed up my night".

11

Further, the evidence obtained in this case was a direct result of the unlawful
seizing of Worwood and his truck. It cannot be presumed that the results of the field
sobriety tests would have been the same had they been conducted at the scene of the stop.
There is no evidence regarding how long the delay was between the stop and when field
sobriety tests were finally performed, during which delay Worwood's blood-alcohol level
was likely changing. Thus, the results of the field sobriety tests were subject to exclusion
under both state and federal law.
Under the Fourth Amendment, "Evidence obtained as a direct result of an
unconstitutional search or seizure is plainly subject to exclusion. The question to be
resolved when it is claimed that evidence subsequently obtained is 'tainted' or is 'fruit' of
a prior illegality is whether the challenged evidence was 'come at by exploitation of [the
initial] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.' Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (quoting Wong Sun v
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
The evidence in this case was obtained as a result of the illegal seizure of
Worwood. Therefore, the test results should have been excluded under both the Fourth
Amendment and the more protective provisions of article I, section 14. Accordingly, the
court of appeals' contrary holding is incorrect.
B.

The seizing of Worwood and his truck was similarly a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.

Because article I, section 14 offers greater protections than the Fourth Amendment
12

(Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ^fl 1), it follows that conduct in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is also in violation of the Utah Constitution. Thus, a separate analysis
of the issues under the Fourth Amendment is warranted.
Under the Fourth Amendment, "an investigative detention must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the stop [and] . . . the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available
to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed.
2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) (plurality opinion) (cited by Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 420 (2005); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 543 (Utah App. 1990)); see also, United
States v. Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1995) (UA permissible investigative stop may
become an unlawful arrest if the means of detention are 'more intrusive than necessary'")
(citation omitted).
In this case, Trooper Wright's testified that he could have performed field sobriety
tests at the stop, but he "didn't want to." (R92:10, 14). In other words, he did not use the
least intrusive means available to confirm or dispel his suspicion that Worwood was
impaired, and the transporting of Worwood to another location was wholly unnecessary.
The Utah Court of Appeals found Trooper Wright's conduct justified and cited
United States v. Sharpe1 in affirming the trial court's denial of Worwood's motion to
suppress. State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, ^|8. The court of appeals' reliance on

7

470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
13

Sharpe is interesting, because Sharpe actually supports Worwood's position.
In Sharpe, the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that police are required to pursue "a
means of investigation . . . likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during
which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at
686 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Supreme Court "emphasized the need to consider
the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably
needed to effectuate those purposes." Id. at 685; see also, Fisher v Harden^ 398 F.3d
837 (6th Cir. 2005) ("An investigative [detention] may ripen into a de facto arrest through
the passage of time or the use of force. If, through the passage of time or use of force, an
investigative detention ripens into an arrest, a suspect's continued detention must be based
upon probable cause.... The investigative methods employed should be the least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short
period of time) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. (1968)).
The Utah Court of Appeals ignored all of these factors. It sanctioned a means of
investigation that was not only unnecessary and intrusive, but unlikely to confirm or
dispel Trooper Wright's suspicions quickly. Indeed, the court did not just ignore the
officer's expressed purpose of promoting his own convenience in transporting Worwood
to another location (R92:10-14), but erroneously concluded, "the record gives no
indication that under these unique circumstances Trooper Wright was motivated by any
purpose other than quickly and effectively resolving his suspicion that Worwood was

14

intoxicated." State v. Worwood, 2005 UT 539, f9.
This incorrect factual conclusion is puzzling in light of what was argued below and
mirrored by Justice Thome's observation from the record that u[The officer] . . .did not
want to 'mess [] up [his] night' by incurring the responsibility for Worwood's potential
arrest and its accompanying paperwork. Instead, he wanted to hand off the situation to a
fellow officer." State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, fn. 4.
According to Trooper Wright's own testimony, the least intrusive means available
to him for quickly confirming or dispelling his suspicion that Worwood was impaired was
a short field sobriety test that should have been conducted at the scene of the stop. The
unnecessary seizing of Worwood and his truck without probable cause and to facilitate
officer convenience exceeded the scope of an investigative detention and thereby violated
the Fourth Amendment. The court of appeals' contrary holding is incorrect.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals created a new personal convenience exception to both
article I, section 14, and the Fourth Amendment. In light of contradictory precedent from
this and other courts cited herein, the Utah Court of Appeals' holding in this case is
unhelpful to either police or prosecutors, and thus an unworkable anomaly in search and
seizure jurisprudence. It is inconsistent and has only generated additional confusion in an
area of the law that is growing increasingly complex.
Particularly under article I, section 14, this new exception not only expands the

15

parameters of permissible police conduct in the context of an investigative detention, but
it blurs the line between an investigative detention and an arrest. Moreover, it diminishes
citizens' privacy and protections against unlawful search and seizure. Therefore, it
abdicates those protections and adds complexity and inconsistency to an already
complicated and inconsistent area of jurisprudence
Accordingly, Petitioner, Mitchell Worwood, respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the Utah Court of Appeals and to vacate his conviction.
Respectfully submitted this j/j day of April, 2006.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

C

/^

Scott €ard/Jehnifer Gt>wans
Attorneys for Mr. Worwood

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Assistant
Attorney General Fred Voros Jr., 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-0854, this 0 ^ day of April, 2006.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
RULING DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
RULING
v.
Case No. 031600152

MITCHELL L. WORWOOD
Defendant.

Judge Donald J. Eyre

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being
fully advised in the premises, issues the following:
FACTUAL SUMMARY
1.

On or about June 20, 2003, Korey Wright, an off duty highway patrolman, was in

the area of Deep Canyon when he observed a pickup truck stopped in the middle of the road.
Near the truck, Trooper Wright saw a man, a wet spot in the road, and a beer can. Trooper
Wright observed the man get in the truck and pull it over to the side of the road so that Trooper
Wright could pass. Trooper Wright later observed a cooler that appeared to have been recently
emptied.
2.

Trooper Wright stopped to talk to the man, who was later identified as Mitchell

Worwood. While talking to Mr. Worwood, Trooper Wright noticed Mr. Worwood had blood
shot eyes and slurred speech. After talking with Mr. Worwood at a closer proximity, Trooper
Wright also smelled the odor of alcohol. Based on these observations, Trooper Wright believed
that Mr. Worwood was intoxicated and was unable to safely operate his vehicle. Due to this

OiO

belief, Trooper Wright indicated to Mr. Worwood that he was not going to allow Mr. Worwood
to drive until he had been checked out by an officer. Trooper Wright testified that Mr. Worwood
was not free to leave at this point.
3.

Trooper Wright did not have a telephone or other means to communicate with law

enforcement. Due to this fact, Trooper Wright asked Mr. Worwood to ride with him in the
trooper's truck and have another individual drive Mr. Worwood5s truck to Trooper Wright's
house, which was nearby, in order to meet a law enforcement officer. Mr. Worwood then got
into Trooper Wright's truck, Trooper Wright's passenger got into Mr. Worwood's truck, and
they all drove a short distance to Trooper Wright's house.
4.

Another highway patrol trooper, Kevin Wright, responded to Korey Wright's

house and took over this investigation. Trooper Kevin Wright administered field sobriety tests to
the Defendant. The Defendant failed these tests, and Trooper Kevin Wright arrested Mr.
Worwood.
RULING
The "right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures" is guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Generally, there are three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between police
officers and the public:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop', (3) an officer may arrest a
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed
or is being committed.
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616,
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617-18 (Utah 1987)).
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that a person is not seized when a police officer
merely approaches the person on the street and asks questions if the person stopped is willing to
listen. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App 1987). In this case, Trooper Wright
approached Mr. Worwood and asked what he was doing. At this point, Mr. Worwood was
willing to listen and answer the trooper's questions. The defendant was free to leave, and
Trooper Wright had not shown any authority over the defendant. Therefore, this Court finds that
the trooper's initial interaction with the defendant was a level one interaction.
A person is "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when an officer
deprives a person of his liberty by means of physical force or show of authority. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App 1987). Under the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, there must be a reasonable
basis for even a brief investigatory detention and officers must have a "reasonable suspicion, based
on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, 51 (1979). Whether the objective facts known to the officer support a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances and in light of the officer's
experience and training. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986).
In this case, while the trooper was speaking with the defendant, the trooper noticed that
the defendant had blood shot eyes, that his speech was slurred, and that the defendant had an odor
of alcohol on his breath. The trooper also observed the defendant's truck, an empty beer can, a
wet spot, and an emptied cooler in the middle of the mountain road. Mr. Worwood also indicated
to the trooper that he had stopped to urinate. These observations in totality caused the trooper to
believe that Mr. Worwood was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was unable to
safely operate his vehicle.
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The Court finds that under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable
suspicion that the defendant was committing a crime and lawfully detained the defendant to
investigate. See, State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The encounter escalated
to a level two encounter when Trooper Wright told the defendant that he could not drive his
vehicle until he had been checked out by another officer. The trooper also testified that the
defendant was not free to leave at this point.
The defendant argues that his detention became illegal when the trooper required him to
ride to another location and wait for another trooper to conduct field sobriety tests. The Utah
Supreme Court has held that an investigatory detention must be "temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effect the purpose of the stop." State v. Deitnian, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah
1987).
In this case, the Court finds that it was reasonable for the trooper to transport the
defendant a short distance from the mountain rode where the stop occurred to the trooper's
home. The Court finds that transporting the defendant to another location was reasonable under
the circumstances and that it was more fair to the defendant to conduct the field sobriety test in a
location that would allow the oflficer to obtain accurate test results. Additionally, the Court finds
under the circumstances that it was reasonable for Trooper Korey Wright to hand off the
investigation of DUI to another trooper in that the DUI statutes allow the trooper to hand off a
DUI investigation and the trooper's actions did not cause an unreasonable delay in the
investigation. Therefore, the Court finds that the defendant was not unlawfully detained.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that Defendant's Motion to Suppr
denied.

DATED this / D

day of April, 2004

*2E2£&
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ADDENDUM B
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, §14
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT IV

Utah Constitution, Article I, §14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

United States Constitution, Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

ADDENDUM C
STATE V. WORWOOD, 2005 UT APP 539, 127 P.3D 1265

LEXSEE 2005 UT APP 539
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Mitchell Worwood, Defendant and
Appellant.
Case No. 20040701-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2005 UTApp 539; 127R3d 1265; 541 Utah Adv. Rep. 25; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS
553
December 15, 2005, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Fourth District, Nephi
Department. 031600152. The Honorable Steven L.
Hansen.

COUNSEL: Scott P. Card and Jennifer Gowans, Provo,
for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and J. Frederic Voros Jr., Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
JUDGES: James Z. Davis, Judge. Carolyn B. McHugh,
Judge, THORNE, Judge (dissenting).
OPINIONBY: James Z. Davis
OPINION: [**1266] DAVIS, Judge:
[*P1] Mitchell Worwood appeals the district court's
ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence taken
during sobriety tests. We affirm.

exited his vehicle to continue the conversation and
testified that he smelled alcohol on Worwood's breath, n I
Ail of these signs led Trooper Wright to believe that
Worwood was likely intoxicated and could not safely
operate a vehicle. Trooper Wright told Worwood that he
would not allow him to drive until he had been checked
out by a police officer. Worwood appeared to recognize
that Trooper Wright was a law enforcement officer and
complied with the request. Because Trooper Wright did
not have a telephone or other means of communication,
he instructed Fautin to drive Worwood's vehicle to a
nearby dairy and call for an officer to respond at Trooper
Wright's house. Trooper Wright then asked Worwood to
accompany him there, to which Worwood agreed, and
Trooper Wright drove him approximately a mile and a
half to his house. There, they met an on-duty trooper
who performed a field sobriety test, determined there
was probable cause to arrest, and transported Worwood
to the Juab County [***3] Jail where further tests
revealed a breath alcohol concentration of .248. n2

BACKGROUND
[*P2] On June 20, 2003, Korey Wright, an off-duty
Utah Highway Patrol trooper, and his friend, Skyler
Fautin, were driving Wright's pickup truck and horse
trailer on a dirt road out of Deep Canyon in Juab County
when they encountered a white pickup truck parked in
the middle of the road. At the time, Worwood, the driver
of the truck, had exited the vehicle, but soon reentered
and drove it to the side of the road to allow Trooper
Wright and his truck to pass. Trooper Wright noticed a
large wet spot in the road, a beer can, and later an ice
cooler that apparently had been recently emptied.
[*P3] Trooper [***2] Wright pulled his vehicle
alongside Worwood's to speak to him. During the
conversation, Trooper Wright noted [**1267] that
Worwood, who was sitting in the driver's seat, had
bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Trooper Wright

nl Worwood claims on appeal that Trooper
Wright smelled alcohol on Worwood's breath
only after Worwood was seated in Trooper
Wright's pickup truck, but fails to challenge the
trial court's finding that Trooper Wright smelled
the odor of alcohol on Worwood's breath "after
talking with Mr. Worwood at a closer proximity"
but before asking him to ride with him in the
truck. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, P67, 63
P. 3d 731 (noting that a trial court's finding of fact
is conclusive unless appellant proves the trial
court committed clear error and marshals all the
record evidence in support of and against the
finding).
n2 The arresting officer testified that
Worwood had a blood alcohol content of ".248
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liters," which presumably means a level of .248
grams per 210 liters of breath. See Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(c) (Supp. 2002) (renumbered
as Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2005)).

light of common sense and ordinary human experience
and . . . accord deference to an officer's ability to
distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions."' Id
at PI I (alteration in original) (quoting United States v
Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir 2001)).

[*P4] [***4] Before trial, Worwood moved to
suppress the evidence obtained from the sobriety test,
claiming it was obtained by means of an illegal seizure.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found that
Trooper Wright had noticed signs of intoxication early in
the encounter, including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech,
and "after talking with Mr. Worwood at a closer
proximity, Trooper Wright also smelled the odor of
alcohol." The trial court also found that testing Worwood
at another location was necessary because "it was more
fair to the defendant to conduct the field sobriety test in a
location that would allow the officer to obtain accurate
test results." The trial court denied the motion,
concluding that under these circumstances Trooper
Wright had a reasonable suspicion to execute a level-two
investigatory detention and that driving Worwood to
Trooper Wright's house was a reasonable extension of
that detention. We agree and affirm.

[*P7] Here, Trooper Wright effected a level-two
investigative detention after seeing an empty beer can, a
large wet spot, and later an empty cooler. He also noticed
signs that Worwood was intoxicated, including bloodshot
eyes, slurred speech, and the odor of alcohol on his
breath. These indicators, combined with the fact that
Worwood apparently intended to continue driving,
justify the reasonable and common sense inference that
Worwood had been or was about to drive a motor vehicle
while intoxicated.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P5] On appeal, Worwood claims that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress because (1)
Trooper Wright did not have a reasonable suspicion
sufficient to effect an investigatory detention and (2)
when [***5] Trooper Wright drove him to Trooper
Wright's house to perform the field sobriety test, the
encounter became a de facto arrest for which there was
no probable cause. We review the trial court's legal basis
for denying Worwood's motion for correctness without
deference to the trial court's application of the law to the
facts. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, PI5, 103 P. 3d
699.
ANALYSIS
[*P6] Worwood first contends that Trooper Wright
did not have sufficient grounds to execute an
investigatory detention. "It is settled law that 'a police
officer may detain and question an individual when the
officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity.'" State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, P10, 112 P.3d
507 (quoting State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah
1996)). Although the officer's suspicion must be based
on '"specific and articulable facts and rational
inferences,'" it need not be supported by probable cause
or even a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (quoting
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 [**1268]
(10th Cir. 1990)). In reviewing an officer's [***6]
conduct under the Fourth Amendment, we consider the
facts in their totality and '"judge the officer's conduct in

[*P8]
Second, Worwood contends that when
Trooper Wright drove him to another location to perform
a field sobriety test he exceeded the scope of the
investigative detention and effected a de facto arrest
After commencing an investigative detention, officers
must '""dilligently [***7]
[pursue] a means of
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to
detain the defendant.'"" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,
1132 (Utah 1994) (alterations in original) (citations
omitted). Defendant correctly observes that an
investigative detention may become a de facto arrest
requiring probable cause when police transport a suspect
to a new location. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442
US. 200, 216, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979).
However, while courts acknowledge that the precise
point at which an investigative detention becomes a de
facto arrest is not clear, an important factor in
determining when an arrest has occurred is whether the
degree of intrusion is not "reasonably related to the facts
and circumstances at hand." State v Leonard, 825 P 2d
664, 669-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). We recognize the
'"important need to allow authorities to graduate their
responses to the demands of any particular situation,'"
and the fact that we could conceive of less intrusive
means to resolve a suspicion does not alone render an
officer's efforts to resolve the suspicion [***8]
unreasonable. United States v Sharpe 4n0 (rS 6~*^
686-87, 105 S Ct. 1568, 84 L Ed 2d 605 (1985)
(citation omitted). Rather, we consider only whether the
officer's failure to pursue such other means was
unreasonable. See id.
[*P9] We appreciate the concerns expressed by our
colleague in his dissent and note that Trooper Wright's
mode of investigation would be permissible only in the
rarest of circumstances and that this case ultimately turns
on the unique set of facts it presents, albeit on a sparse
record. Upon review of the known facts, we cannot
conclude that an off-duty law enforcement officer
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exceeds the permissible scope of an investigatory
detention when he transports a driver he suspects to be
intoxicated a short distance from an uninhabited area to
meet an on-duty officer for further investigation. Trooper
Wright testified that he was returning from horseback
riding in a pickup truck with an attached horse trailer,
had no means of communication, and was not equipped
to make a formal arrest. Trooper Wright indicated to
Worwood that the detention was temporary and for
investigatory purposes by explaining that he could not
allow him to drive "until he had been [***9] checked
out by an officer." Although Trooper Wright may have
been able to perform a sufficient field sobriety test on
Worwood at the point of the initial encounter in Deep
Canyon and possibly to transport him to the Juab County
Jail, it was not unreasonable for him to drive Worwood
to a nearby location in the town to permit an on-duty
officer to perform a field sobriety test and, if necessary,
effect a formal arrest. Further, the trial court found that
conducting the sobriety test in town would "allow the
officer to obtain accurate test results." Worwood has not
challenged this finding and has not alleged that the
results of the sobriety test would have been substantially
different if conducted minutes earlier. Finally, there is no
evidence that the change of location significantly
extended the encounter, and the record gives no
indication that under these unique circumstances Trooper
Wright was motivated by any purpose other than quickly
[** 1269] and effectively resolving his suspicion that
Worwood was intoxicated.
[*P10] Accordingly, we affirm.
James Z. Davis, Judge
[*P11] I CONCUR:
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
DISSENTBY: William A. Thome Jr.
DISSENT: THORNE, Judge (dissenting): [***10]
[*P12] I respectfully dissent from the majority's
conclusion that this case presents merely a level two stop
of reasonable scope and duration.
[*P13] First and foremost, I believe that Trooper
Wright made a de facto arrest of Worwood when he took
physical custody of Worwood and transported him from
the canyon where the initial encounter occurred to
Wright's private residence. As a level three encounter,
this arrest was illegal because it was not supported by
probable cause. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, P36,
63 PJd 650 ("A level three encounter involves an arrest,
which has been characterized as a highly intrusive or
lengthy detention that requires probable cause."

(alterations omitted) (quotations and citations omitted)).
However, even if Wright's actions created only a level
two encounter, Worwood's detention was unreasonable
in both its scope and its duration. See Salt Lake City v
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, P10, 998 P 2d 274 ("[A level two]
'detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessar> to effectuate the purpose oi the ^iup[ j "
(citation omitted)). Wright's actions violated the Fourth
Amendment under either analysis, [***11] and I would
suppress all evidence obtained as a result of those
actions.
[*P14] The only competent evidence of the events
surrounding Worwood's encounter with Wright was
Wright's testimony at the suppression hearing nl Wright
testified that he took Worwood into custody after
observing his bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Rather
than perform field sobriety tests on Worwood at the
scene, however, Wright transported him in Wright's
private vehicle out of the canyon, onto the state highway,
and to Wright's private residence n2 in Levan, Utah, a
distance of "about a mile and a half." Wright testified
that he believed that Worwood knew he was a law
enforcement officer. Wright entrusted Worwood's
vehicle to Wright's passenger, and the passenger drove
the vehicle to a local dairy to call for assistance, and then
to Wright's residence.

nl The trooper who formally arrested
Worwood testified at the preliminary hearing, but
he offered only hearsay testunonv about the
circumstances of Worwood's initial detention and
transport.
n2 The fact that Wright chose to transport
Worwood to his private residence gives me
additional concern. While it does not appear to
have been a factor in this case, the transport of a
lone detainee to a private residence, in an
unmarked car by an off-duty officer, could
present significant cause for alarm to the
detainee, particularly if it occurred at night If the
officer was an imposter, discomfort could
escalate into grave danger. I do not believe that
this is the sort of scenario that we wish to
encourage by excusing Wright's actions in this
case.
[***12]
[*P15] These actions represent a significant seizure
of Worwood and his vehicle, and any reasonable person
in Worwood's position would have interpreted these
actions as an arrest. Accordingly, I would hold that
Wright effected a level three arrest as soon as Worwood
became aware that he was in police custody, that his
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vehicle had been seized, and that he was going to be
transported a significant distance for the purpose of
being handed off to another officer. See State v. Leonard,
825 P.2d 664, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (Orme, J.,
dissenting) ("The accepted rule is that what might have
otherwise been a level-two stop evolves into a level-three
de facto arrest when, in view of all the circumstances, a
reasonable, innocent person in the suspect's place would
believe himself to be under arrest."); see also Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d
229 (1983) (characterizing the relevant inquiry as
whether the suspect believed he was being detained). I
would also hold that Wright's observations of Worwood
provided only a reasonable suspicion that Worwood was
driving while intoxicated, but not the level of probable
cause required to make an [*** 13] arrest. n3

n4 Wright, being off duty, did not want to
"mess[] up [his] night" by incurring the
responsibility for Worwood's potential arrest and
its accompanying paperwork. Instead, he wanted
to hand off the situation to a fellow officer. While
I find this motivation understandable, Wright,
having chosen to exercise the power of the State
to investigate Worwood despite his off-duty
status, owed Worwood the full complement of
constitutional rights. I do not believe that those
rights permit the scope or duration of a level two
stop to be extended on the basis of an officer's
desire to avoid the responsibility of otherwise
necessary paperwork.
[***15]

n3 Wright testified that the only evidence of
Worwood's intoxication at the time of his initial
detention was his bloodshot eyes and slurred
speech. He testified that he only smelled alcohol
on Worwood once he and Worwood were inside
Wright's vehicle. Accordingly, Worwood's arrest
preceded Wright's observation of the smell of
alcohol, and that evidence cannot be used to
bolster the legality of Worwood's initial arrest.
Even taking the smell of alcohol into account,
however, I believe that Wright could only
objectively be said to have had a reasonable
suspicion of Worwood's intoxication.
[**1270] [*P16] Wright's reasonable suspicion
clearly justified some detention of Worwood for further
investigation. However, Wright exceeded the permissible
scope and duration of that detention when he transported
Worwood to his home for performance of field sobriety
tests that could just as easily have been conducted at the
initial scene. "Officers must diligently pursue a means of
investigation that is likely to confirm [***14] or dispel
their suspicions quickly[.]" State v. Chism, 2005 UT App
41, P12, 107 P.3d 706 (quotations and citation omitted).
Wright testified that he could have performed field
sobriety tests at the scene of the initial encounter, but
chose not to for the sole reason of personal convenience.
n4 The resulting increase in both the scope and the
duration of Worwood's detention were therefore
unnecessary and exceeded the legal boundaries of an
otherwise legitimate level two stop. See id. at P15
("Investigative acts that are not reasonably related to
dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for the
stop are permissible only if they do not add to the delay
already lawfully experienced and do not represent any
further intrusion on [the detainee's] rights." (alteration in
original) (quotations and citation omitted)).

[*P17] The majority suggests that Worwood's
transport was also justified by Wright's motive to obtain
more accurate results from field sobriety tests. 1 find this
unavailing, as field sobriety tests are routinely performed
roadside in less than ideal conditions. Further, such a
justification would permit the routine "relocation" of
drunken driving suspects to a jail or police station where
environmental factors such as light, sound, and footing
could be controlled.
[*P18] For these reasons, n5 I would hold that
Wright's actions constitute both a level three stop
unsupported by probable cause, and an impermissible
departure from the allowable scope and duration of a
legitimate level two stop. Under either analysis, the
challenged evidence must be suppressed and Worwood's
conviction reversed. Accordingly, I dissent from the
majority opinion.

n5 I believe reversal is warranted solely on
the basis of violations of Worwood's Fourth
Amendment rights. However, 1 cannot help
looking beyond the immediate case and seeing in
the majority opinion a green light for the routine
transport of drunken driving suspects on the
flimsiest of excuses. In my opinion, today's result
opens the door for ail manners of avoidance of
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. For
example, the resulting ability to make an
inventory search of a suspect's vehicle will
provide a strong incentive for law enforcement to
"smell alcohol" and transport the suspect and his
vehicle, allowing them to make an otherwise
impermissible search of the vehicle for
contraband.
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[***16]
William A. Thome Jr., Judge

